The economy of Western Pomerania suffered further heavy losses due to the dismantling and exploitation carried out by the Soviet army. It is difficult today to precisely estimate the scale of these losses, but historians agree that they were even more devastating than those caused by the war itself. According to Polish data, 221 large and medium-sized industrial plants in Western Pomerania were dismantled and shipped east along with their machinery and equipment. In Szczecin, almost all industrial facilities and the power plant shared this fate. Among the largest plants dismantled outside the regional capital were the synthetic fuel factory in Police and the cement plant in Lubin. Electrical installations, railway tracks, means of transport, as well as agricultural machinery and equipment were also taken away. Even some smaller enterprises were not spared requisition. The total value of industrial assets lost in the region is estimated at between 350 and 500 million U.S. dollars. As late as 1948, the Soviet army still controlled 116 industrial sites, for which the Polish side had never granted formal consent.<\/p> \n \n<\/div> \n<\/div> \n<\/div> \n<\/div> \n
The Soviet army\u2019s exploitation of smaller industrial enterprises and agricultural estates caused massive impoverishment of the region\u2019s economy. Nearly half of all plants that had been restarted by July 1945 were seized for military supply purposes. In the spring of 1945, about 60% of landed estates larger than 100 hectares, as well as many large farms, were also taken over. Although this number slightly decreased in the following months, by December approximately 43% of estates still remained under Soviet control. Even as late as 1949, Polish ownership of land existed exclusively in less than half of the region\u2019s counties. In Western Pomerania, the process of transferring farms to Polish authorities took significantly longer than in other western and northern territories, ending only in September 1950. The scale of destruction was further worsened by the fact that the Soviet army typically occupied the least damaged and best-equipped estates. By the time they were handed over to the Polish administration, they were usually completely devastated and stripped of livestock and equipment.<\/p>\n\n
At the time when Western Pomerania was taken over by the Polish administration, 22.5% of rural farmsteads had been destroyed \u2014 significantly less than in other western and northern territories. However, the situation regarding resources left behind by the German population was much worse. The livestock population steadily declined, and soil fertility deteriorated, as the Germans were no longer able to maintain it at a high level. Even after the end of hostilities, the shortage of draft animals and manpower severely limited the ability to carry out necessary agricultural work.<\/p>\n\n
The evacuating German population took with them the vast majority of livestock, farming tools, and household equipment. Only a portion of the land had been sown. Additional losses were caused by military operations\u2014particularly in the southern counties\u2014and by requisitions to supply the troops. Livestock numbers plummeted dramatically: horses by 90%, cattle by 92%, pigs by 96%, and sheep by 97%. The greatest losses in livestock were recorded in the counties of Choszczno, Gryfino, Kamie\u0144 Pomorski, and Szczecin. In the spring of 1945, the rural areas of Western Pomerania had only 15,300 head of cattle, 11,400 pigs, 5,100 sheep, and 8,000 horses\u2014representing just 1.7%, 0.7%, 1.1%, and 4.0% of prewar levels, respectively. Due to the widespread devastation, by March 1946, some 11,000 farms remained unoccupied and uncultivated.<\/p>\n\n
The opening balance must also include the losses caused by the removal of property by the Poles themselves. Individual looting began immediately after the front had passed and soon reached the scale of a plague. German property was treated as ownerless. It was not until the decree of March 1946 that such property was declared state-owned and its removal prohibited. Yet while the authorities sought to curb looting, they simultaneously organized removals on an even larger scale, officially referring to the practice as \u201csecuring property.\u201d \n \nAt the request of many institutions from central Poland, for several postwar years bricks from Western Pomerania were shipped to rebuild Warsaw, \u0141\u00f3d\u017a, Bydgoszcz, Gda\u0144sk, Toru\u0144, and Stalowa Wola. As late as 1949, two trainloads of bricks were being sent daily from Szczecin. Machinery and industrial equipment, workshop furnishings, and even works of art and library collections were also transported out of the region.<\/p>\n\n
Despite the enormous losses, Poland\u2019s takeover of Western Pomerania contributed to the modernization of the country\u2019s economic structure and increased its potential in the difficult process of postwar reconstruction. Compared to the national average, agriculture in Western Pomerania stood at a relatively high agrotechnical level; transportation benefited from a well-developed network of railways and paved roads, and\u2014above all\u2014from access to ports. The cities were equipped with fairly good technical and economic infrastructure. \n \nFurther development of the region within the borders of the Polish state required building new economic ties with Poland\u2019s prewar territories, creating long-term development plans, and, finally, ensuring a supply of qualified personnel.<\/p>\n\n
Postwar Reconstruction (up to 1950)<\/p>\n\n
The postwar economic reconstruction of the region began spontaneously and without any coherent plan. It was carried out in parallel with the complete population exchange\u2014by 1949, the vast majority of the German population had been expelled, and in their place, as part of a spontaneous and large-scale resettlement campaign, nearly one million Poles arrived. The newcomers were predominantly poorly educated rural inhabitants and members of the lowest urban social strata. The recovering economy suffered above all from a shortage of much-needed engineers, technicians, and skilled workers.<\/p>\n\n
The number of settlers also proved insufficient\u2014after the end of the first wave of resettlement, it reached only about 50% of the prewar population. While in mid-1948 the average population density in Poland was 78 people per square kilometer, in the Szczecin Voivodeship it was only 32. Western Pomerania was thus the most sparsely populated region of the country.<\/p>
Significant disparities in the distribution of settlers were also visible. In the counties of Szczecin, Wolin, and Byt\u00f3w, one could even speak of a population void. By 1950, out of 72 towns in the region, as many as 55 had fewer than 5,000 inhabitants, and only the two largest\u2014Szczecin and S\u0142upsk\u2014had populations exceeding 30,000.<\/p><\/p>\n\n
A top priority for both central and local authorities was rural settlement. The main obstacle was the shortage of livestock, agricultural machinery, and seed material. The number of farms suitable for immediate occupation declined rapidly. To repair and restore the remaining ones, cheap loans were essential\u2014but the state was unable to provide them. \n \nAn important element of agrarian transformation between 1945 and 1948 was the creation of a dense network of large, state-administered farms. This process was facilitated by the prewar agrarian structure. Some of the large landed estates were earmarked for parceling under the land reform program, resulting in the establishment of over 100,000 farms with an average size of more than 8 hectares. However, a significant portion of the estates remained in state hands. Their division was hindered by the lack of suitable buildings adapted to the needs of peasant farms. Initially, settlement and parceling cooperatives were created, but the authorities soon seized the opportunity to permanently nationalize these properties. Their management was taken over by the State Agricultural Estates (Pa\u0144stwowe Nieruchomo\u015bci Ziemskie), established in 1946 and transformed in 1949 into State Agricultural Farms (Pa\u0144stwowe Gospodarstwa Rolne \u2013 PGRs). \n \nBy April 1949, the state sector already controlled one-quarter of all agricultural land in the region.<\/p>\n\n
During the first several months of Polish presence in Western Pomerania, the restoration of urban infrastructure and industrial potential took place in a spontaneous and uncoordinated manner. The first step was to secure abandoned property, followed by the reactivation of what was most essential to the newly settled population\u2014such as power plants, waterworks, and the least-damaged facilities, including food-processing plants, soap and detergent factories, and energy infrastructure. \n \nThe highest number of surviving enterprises belonged to the food industry (796), wood industry (361), and metal industry (297). By the end of 1946, a total of 1,148 facilities were operating\u2014representing only 38.5% of prewar establishments and employing 14% of the prewar workforce. Approximately 60% of the restored facilities were located in the western part of the voivodeship. These were mostly small and medium-sized enterprises, provisionally repaired and reopened primarily through the efforts of local authorities, with minimal assistance from the central government. \n \nAn interesting local initiative was the establishment of the \u201cDana\u201d Clothing Industry Plant (Zak\u0142ady Przemys\u0142u Odzie\u017cowego \u201cDana\u201d). The craft industry recovered more quickly\u2014out of more than 30,000 prewar workshops, about one in four survived the war. By 1947, 5,823 craft workshops were in operation, and by 1948 this number had increased to 6,752.<\/p>\n\n
The reconstruction carried out during this initial period only minimally included the maritime potential of Western Pomerania. Most of the infrastructure related to this sector of the economy remained under the control of the Soviet army. Further progress in rebuilding the regional economy depended on increased investment spending, which became possible only after the adoption of the Three-Year Plan in July 1947. \n \nThe plan aimed to integrate the western and northern territories with the rest of the country. On the national scale, it prioritized industry, energy, mining, and metallurgy (receiving nearly 40% of all investments) as well as transportation (about 27%). Investment funds were to be directed primarily toward key enterprises located in larger cities.<\/p>\n\n
In Western Pomerania, there were relatively few such key industrial sites. Particular attention was given to making use of the Baltic coastline. Szczecin and several smaller seaports\u2014especially Ko\u0142obrzeg and Dar\u0142owo\u2014were in a privileged position, recording their highest operational turnover in 1948. \n \nA so-called economic activation program was launched, with the reconstruction of the Port of Szczecin as its main focus. The goal was to stimulate the economy of the surrounding counties. Although this objective was not fully achieved, the program did succeed in reviving Szczecin\u2019s maritime potential. \n \nThe port\u2019s reconstruction triggered the development of numerous port service companies, small shipping and fishing enterprises, and maritime education. Instead of several small shipyards, a single Szczecin Shipyard was created. Due to the extent of wartime destruction and postwar dismantling, the rebuilding of all shipyard slipways took several years. \n \nSzczecin\u2019s municipal infrastructure also expanded significantly during this period. Outside the capital, important enterprises included: \n \na small oil and fat plant in Stargard, \n \na sewing factory in My\u015blib\u00f3rz, \n \na match factory in Sian\u00f3w, \n \na farm tool factory in S\u0142upsk, \n \na stove factory in Dar\u0142owo, and \n \na flax scutching plant in Koszalin. \n \nHowever, the neglect of many smaller facilities led to their further degradation and indirectly hindered the economic recovery of small towns across the region.<\/p>\n\n
Of the approximately 19 billion z\u0142oty allocated for investment in the Szczecin Voivodeship between 1947 and 1949, \n \n45% was directed toward the expansion of transportation and shipping, \n \n17% toward construction, \n \n15.5% toward agriculture, \n \n11% toward industry, and \n \n9% toward municipal services. \n \nWestern Pomerania received the largest share of investment funds in 1948.<\/p>\n\n
The reconstruction period did not result in a balanced recovery of Western Pomerania\u2019s economic potential. In industry, many factories were still awaiting reopening, and small towns merely struggled to survive. \n \nAgriculture in the region failed to reach prewar levels\u2014neither in crop production nor in livestock breeding. Due to a shortage of labor and equipment, vast areas of arable land remained uncultivated until the mid-1950s. \n \nThe settlers\u2019 sense of stability and economic efficiency were further undermined by unresolved property ownership issues\u2014by 1948, only 3% of farms had been granted ownership titles\u2014and by the collectivization of the countryside, initiated in 1948.<\/p>\n\n
By the end of the Three-Year Plan, the authorities announced that the economic integration of the newly incorporated western territories with the rest of the country had been completed. Under the new conditions defined by the Six-Year Plan, the Szczecin and Koszalin voivodeships were to undergo industrialization according to nationwide guidelines, without consideration for their still clearly distinct demographic and economic specificities. \n \nFor the predominantly agricultural region of Western Pomerania, this meant a slowdown in development and a widening gap compared to other parts of Poland. Apart from Szczecin, there were no major industrial centers in the region. The small towns of Western Pomerania\u2014serving mainly as rural support hubs\u2014did not present an attractive area for the large-scale socialist investments of the time.<\/p>\n\n
The Region During the Implementation of the Six-Year Plan (1950\u20131955)<\/p>\n\n
The main goal of Poland\u2019s Six-Year Plan was rapid industrialization, yet Western Pomerania was assigned the role of an agricultural hinterland. \n \nIn 1950, the large Szczecin voivodeship was divided into two separate administrative regions: Szczecin and Koszalin. The former was to receive 3.2% of total national investments, but only 2% of those allocated to industry. The figures for the Koszalin voivodeship were even lower\u20141.8% overall and 0.35% in industry. \n \nIn contrast, both voivodeships fared better in terms of agricultural investment: Szczecin was to receive 10%, and Koszalin approximately 8.5% of national agricultural funds. At the same time, it was assumed that agricultural output in Western Pomerania would experience the highest growth in Poland, twice the national average.<\/p>\n\n
Greater interest from the central authorities in the economic development of Western Pomerania was evident only in relation to the maritime economy, and to a lesser extent, the heavy and chemical industries. Broader investment activity was almost entirely limited to Szczecin and its surrounding areas. \n \nThe development of the maritime sector was driven by large shipbuilding orders from the USSR. To fulfill these contracts, the Szczecin Shipyard had to be transformed from a repair facility into a shipbuilding yard capable of constructing new vessels. Preparing the shipyard for this new role required significant financial investment. Repair functions were gradually taken over by the Szczecin Repair Shipyard \u201cGryfia\u201d and the \u201cParnica\u201d Repair Shipyard. \n \nThe ports of Western Pomerania, however, faced difficult conditions. The Port of Szczecin received substantial investment for the last time in 1950; during the following five years, funding dropped sharply. The port was designated mainly for transshipment of transit cargo, particularly to Czechoslovakia, and for bulk goods such as coal. By 1955, the port\u2019s potential cargo-handling capacity reached 9.6 million tons, while actual throughput amounted to 6.8 million tons, representing about 40% of Poland\u2019s total maritime turnover. \n \nAs a result of the government\u2019s decision to concentrate cargo operations in the major seaports, the ports of Ustka, Dar\u0142owo, and Ko\u0142obrzeg were closed in 1952.<\/p>\n\n
ChatGPT powiedzia\u0142: \n \nAmong the industrial investments carried out in other sectors of the economy, most were concentrated in Szczecin, including the completion of the reconstruction of the cellulose and paper factory in Skolwin, the \u201cPrzemko\u201d cement plant, the steelworks in Sto\u0142czyn, and the artificial silk factory in \u017bydowce. \n \nOutside the regional capital, notable projects included the fish-processing complex in \u015awinouj\u015bcie, the garment factory in My\u015blib\u00f3rz, and the agro-food plant in D\u0119bno. \n \nAn additional eleven production facilities built during this period had only local significance and limited impact on the region\u2019s overall economic development.<\/p>\n\n
The Koszalin voivodeship was in a much worse economic position, ranking among the three most underinvested regions in Poland. It lacked natural resources and any major industrial centers. Only agro-food production developed there, a sector largely ignored by the Six-Year Plan. \n \nBetween 1950 and 1955, only 13 small industrial plants were completed along the Central Coast, employing a total of 1,104 workers. Among these, the more notable enterprises included: \n \nS\u0142upsk Ship Equipment Plant, \n \nWool Industry Plant in Z\u0142ocieniec, \n \na small fish-processing complex in Ko\u0142obrzeg, \n \na cold-storage facility in Koszalin, \n \na peat-board factory in Czaplinek, and \n \na cardboard factory in K\u0119pice near S\u0142upsk.<\/p>\n\n
Due to a lack of funds, many smaller post-German industrial plants based on local raw materials could not be reopened. Across the region, following Soviet dismantling operations, more than one thousand factories and workshops of various sizes remained partially destroyed or devastated. \n \nAccording to preserved documentation for the Szczecin voivodeship, by the end of 1949, around 250 facilities had been repurposed or reopened, yet about 500 smaller and approximately 80 larger plants still lay in ruins. By 1953, one-third of the inactive industrial sites in Western Pomerania had ceased to exist entirely. \n \nIn July 1955, the Council of Ministers ordered a comprehensive inventory of the remaining facilities, and by June 1956, the first plans for their utilization were presented. Part of the equipment from deteriorating plants was transferred to reinforce industrial enterprises in central Poland.<\/p>\n\n
The targets for agricultural production growth proved difficult to achieve. The collectivization of the countryside, initiated in 1948, resulted by the summer of 1956 in the establishment of 1,362 production cooperatives, which managed about 30% of all agricultural land. However, this form of management turned out to be inefficient. \n \nAt the same time, pressure to collectivize and poor harvests caused a decline in production even on individual peasant farms. Meanwhile, the State Agricultural Farms (PGRs) recorded the largest increase in cultivated area \u2014 70,000 hectares in the Szczecin voivodeship and 50,000 hectares in the Koszalin voivodeship. \n \nDespite huge investment inputs, the PGRs achieved results significantly lower than both private farms and agricultural cooperatives. Overall, the Six-Year Plan\u2019s agricultural targets were not met: livestock production reached only about 40% of planned levels in the Koszalin region and 68% in the Szczecin region.<\/p>\n\n
The failure of state policy toward Western Pomerania during the Stalinist period was evident in the complete halt of new settler inflow, despite the region\u2019s continuing depopulation. \n \nThe suspension of land enfranchisement processes in both rural and urban areas, labor market difficulties, worsening housing conditions, and a low standard of living all contributed to a growing wave of emigration beginning as early as 1949. \n \nIn the first half of the 1950s, between 1,000 and 2,000 families per year left the region \u2014 particularly from its northeastern part.<\/p>\n\n
The first subtle signs of change in the central government\u2019s attitude toward Western Pomerania appeared during the political thaw. This shift was reflected in the renewed government interest in utilizing the deteriorating post-German industrial assets that still existed in the region. \n \nAt the same time, the liberalization of regulations governing the border zone provided an impetus for a new wave of settlement along the Oder River and the Baltic coast, as well as for the revival of seaside tourism.<\/p>\n\n
The Era of W\u0142adys\u0142aw Gomu\u0142ka<\/p>\n\n
The political transformations of 1956 sparked a lively debate about the functioning of the economy. The people and elites of Western Pomerania placed great hopes in W\u0142adys\u0142aw Gomu\u0142ka, expecting a renewed and active state policy toward the Western and Northern Territories. \n \nThe ongoing changes were reflected in the establishment of new state institutions responsible for Western policy, such as the Government Commission for the Development of the Western Territories, the Extraordinary Sejm Commission for the Western Territories, and the Socio-Political Society for the Development of the Western Territories.<\/p>\n\n
The Five-Year Economic Development Plan, adopted only in 1957, partially addressed the need to compensate for earlier mistakes and neglect regarding the economy of Western Pomerania. \n \nAlthough the adopted strategy declared an intention to raise the standard of living and reduce regional and sectoral disparities, this was to be achieved mainly through the continuation of major investments initiated in previous years. Priority was still given to metallurgy, machinery and chemical industries, as well as to the extraction of coal, iron ore, and non-ferrous metals. \n \nReducing development disparities was to occur through the economic activation of individual provinces, rather than through a comprehensive development program for the entire borderland region. Among the areas recognized as most underdeveloped were the Koszalin and Szczecin regions.<\/p>\n\n
For the economy of Western Pomerania, the revival of Poland\u2019s foreign trade held particular importance, as it directly led to a significant acceleration in the development of the maritime economy. \n \nReconstruction and modernization of the slipways at the former \u201cVulkan\u201d shipyard were undertaken, resulting in the creation of a modern shipbuilding center in Szczecin. In September 1959, the yard launched its first 10,000-ton vessel, the Janek Krasicki. \n \nDuring the entire five-year period, the shipyard produced 50 ships with a total deadweight of 220,000 DWT, representing a fourfold increase compared to the previous period. Until the mid-1960s, the shipyard maintained a steady growth in production, but this positive trend was later interrupted by the overall deterioration of the national economy and a reduction in Soviet orders for Polish ships.<\/p>\n\n
The infrastructure of the Szczecin port no longer met the needs of modern shipping. Costly dredging of the fairway was abandoned, and construction began in \u015awinouj\u015bcie on a port capable of accommodating large vessels. This became possible after the Soviet forces handed over part of the eastern bank of the \u015awina River in 1965. In this way, the development of the town was initiated \u2014 before the war, it had been a small fishing port and seaside resort. \n \nPorts in Ko\u0142obrzeg and Dar\u0142owo also gained new development opportunities. In 1960, following local interventions and lobbying efforts, they regained \u2014 after a seven-year break \u2014 the right to receive merchant ships. The initial wave of investment also benefited the Szczecin-based shipowner specializing in tramp shipping. Between 1956 and 1960, the Polish Steamship Company (Polska \u017begluga Morska) acquired 30 new vessels, increasing the company\u2019s tonnage capacity to over 200,000 DWT. \n \nMaritime fisheries in the region were also significantly strengthened. In 1958, the deep-sea fishing company \u201cGryf\u201d was established in Szczecin, which, together with the \u015awinouj\u015bcie-based company \u201cOdra\u201d founded six years earlier, supplied more than 50% of Poland\u2019s total fish catch in the early 1970s. Thanks to the allocation of appropriate funds for the reconstruction and development of small fishing settlements and the introduction of incentives for private fishermen, these ports were revitalized, and coastal and lagoon fishing developed rapidly.<\/p>\n\n
At that time, Western Pomerania also gained more than twenty valuable industrial facilities, among which the most significant were the electrotechnical plants in Za\u0142om, the furniture factory in Goleni\u00f3w, the tannery in K\u0119pice, and several building materials plants. More than 300 small factories and workshops were also launched. The effects of these investments were visible in the revitalization of small towns and settlements, as well as in improved housing conditions, market supply, and services. A new field that began to develop dynamically from the mid-1950s was tourism.<\/p>\n\n
Important changes took place in the countryside after 1956, when 97% of agricultural cooperatives dissolved. The authorities returned to regulating land ownership issues, hoping this would help reduce the outflow of rural population. However, underfunded peasant farms lacked the capacity to rapidly increase production. \n \nIn the 1960s, the state agricultural sector began processes of concentration, which continued into the following decade. Large multi-facility enterprises and agricultural combines were established \u2014 the first of them included those in Tymie\u0144, Radacz, and Barwice. Organizational changes and the gradual modernization of machinery only slightly improved farming efficiency, and agricultural production indicators remained low.<\/p>\n\n
The economic acceleration visible in Western Pomerania after 1956 began to weaken in the following decade. The authorities once again declared the integration of the new territories with Poland complete and returned to a centralized economic model. They also promoted the concept of selective development, which meant favoring the raw materials and fuel sectors while discriminating against industries producing consumer goods. The only branch in Western Pomerania that continued to develop was the maritime economy.<\/p>\n\n
Attempts at modernization in the 1970s<\/p>\n\n
The lack of reforms and the economic stagnation of the 1960s led to a socio-economic crisis in 1970. Szczecin, home to the region\u2019s largest industrial plants, became one of the centers of social unrest. Edward Gierek\u2019s team announced plans to accelerate the country\u2019s economic development and improve citizens\u2019 living conditions. In practice, however, this meant further strengthening the production-oriented sectors of the economy concentrated in industrialized regions, deepening existing disparities. The promises to increase the production of consumer goods were implemented only to a limited extent, and only at the beginning of the decade. For Western Pomerania, this meant the consolidation of its existing economic structure.<\/p>\n\n
As in previous periods, the maritime economy had the most favorable conditions for development. Poland\u2019s opening to the West led to increased investment in port infrastructure and the shipbuilding industry. However, global changes in maritime transport \u2014 particularly the growing tonnage of ships \u2014 exacerbated the problems of the Szczecin port. Although it was modernized by adding nearly 2 kilometers of new quays along existing basins, the insufficient depth of the fairway prevented the port from taking advantage of global market opportunities. \n \nAs a result, the focus of port investment shifted to \u015awinouj\u015bcie. The expansion of the transshipment base \u201c\u015awinoport II\u201d continued, reaching a coal-handling capacity of 3.5 million tons per year at the beginning of the decade. In mid-1973, construction began on the chemical raw materials terminal \u201c\u015awinoport III.\u201d Although port investments in Western Pomerania were increasing, they remained disproportionately lower than those allocated to the development of ports at the mouth of the Vistula River.<\/p>\n\n
Compared to previous years, the funds allocated to the development of maritime shipping increased significantly, benefiting the Szczecin-based shipowner, the Polish Steamship Company (P\u017bM). The fleet was expanded with bulk carriers of over 50,000 tons deadweight, as well as vessels designed for transporting both dry and liquid cargo. The average ship size increased, and the fleet underwent renewal and modernization. \n \nBy 1975, P\u017bM operated 124 ships with a total deadweight capacity of 2,854,000 tons \u2014 nearly two million tons more than just four years earlier. This rapid growth resulted from the dominance of bulk trade in Poland\u2019s foreign commerce, which favored a shipowner specializing in tramp shipping. By the end of the decade, ships operated by the Szczecin carrier accounted for nearly 40% of the entire Polish fleet. \n \nTaking advantage of the favorable economic climate, local business circles succeeded in establishing another shipping company in Ko\u0142obrzeg in 1976 \u2014 the Polish Baltic Shipping Company (Polska \u017begluga Ba\u0142tycka). Despite high ambitions and an energetic start, it failed to achieve the expected success, and its flagship ferry line was soon discontinued due to unprofitability.<\/p>\n\n
At the beginning of the 1970s, the shipbuilding industry was included among the sectors prioritized for development. The shipyards in Szczecin benefited from this policy, receiving increased financial investment. The Szczecin Shipyard became an even larger exporter of ships than before, producing around ten vessels annually, each with a deadweight capacity of 100\u2013200 thousand tons. Their size, however, was limited by the dimensions of the slipways and the depth of the Szczecin\u2013\u015awinouj\u015bcie fairway. As a result, the shipyards mainly produced bulk carriers, chemical tankers, and passenger-car ferries.<\/p>\n\n
As part of the continued strategy for developing Poland\u2019s energy industry, one of the major new investments launched in 1970 was the construction of the large thermal power plant \u201cDolna Odra\u201d in Gryfino. This project was intended to significantly improve the energy balance of northwestern Poland. It also contributed to the development of the town itself, whose population grew substantially\u2014from 6,500 in 1970 to 10,000 in 1977 and 20,000 in 1987. Gryfino became one of the few localities in Western Pomerania to benefit from the country\u2019s accelerated development policy. \n \nIn Szczecin and its surroundings, the chemical industry plant in Police was expanded, and both the Cable Factory in Za\u0142om and the Automotive Mechanisms Factory \u201cPolmo\u201d were modernized. However, smaller centers in the region hardly felt any increase in investment spending. The economic crisis that began in 1976 affected all branches of Western Pomerania\u2019s economy, leading to an investment downturn and diminishing prospects for further development.<\/p>\n\n
The state sector, which dominated agriculture in the region, began expanding its land holdings at the expense of private farms in the early 1970s. Thanks to increased funding and the allocation of imported fodder to State Agricultural Farms (PGRs), the first half of the decade saw a modest rise in the share of state-owned farms in the region\u2019s agricultural production. However, this did not translate into improved efficiency. When the overall economic situation deteriorated and fodder imports were reduced, the PGR system collapsed. \n \nIn somewhat better condition were the specialized farms in Western Pomerania operated by scientific and research institutions, such as the Potato Research Station in Bonin.<\/p>\n\n
The Final Decade of the Polish People\u2019s Republic<\/p>\n\n
The economic collapse that began in the early 1980s led to stagnation, and even regression, in the economy of Western Pomerania. In their search for ways to address immediate problems, the authorities completely abandoned any efforts aimed at improving the region\u2019s economic structure. The rigid adherence to the principle of centralized economic management left local governments without the ability to act. \n \nProduction and services declined sharply across all sectors. The collapse of coal exports by sea caused a significant drop in the turnover of the Szczecin\u2013\u015awinouj\u015bcie port complex. Stagnation in the global maritime economy and a lack of investment had a negative impact on the condition of the Polish Steamship Company (P\u017bM), which lacked funds for modernization and the purchase of new vessels. As a result, the company\u2019s fleet steadily shrank. Deep-sea fishing, which had flourished during the 1960s, also entered a period of decline.<\/p>\n\n
As a result of declining global demand, the number of ships built at the Szczecin Shipyard and the volume of orders at repair shipyards decreased. Numerous companies cooperating with the shipyards also felt the impact. The consequences of these negative trends included not only a drop in current production but also the growing wear and depreciation of assets owned by individual enterprises. \n \nAs in other regions of the country, the construction and supply sectors also collapsed. The top-down reforms implemented between 1982 and 1987 not only failed to improve the situation but instead deepened the chaos and further worsened the economic condition of enterprises.<\/p>\n\n
The crisis did not spare agriculture either. As a result of restrictions introduced after the declaration of martial law, the import of animal feed dropped drastically, leading to a sharp decline in livestock production. Significant changes also took place in the state agricultural sector. At the beginning of the decade, State Agricultural Farms (PGRs) were placed under the authority of provincial governors and, like all other enterprises in the economy, began operating under the new conditions of economic reform. \n \nThis meant, among other things, the withdrawal of state subsidies in exchange for greater organizational autonomy. As part of efforts to rationalize management methods, employment was reduced, and land area was partially adjusted to available technical resources. These changes brought only a temporary improvement in the economic condition of the PGRs, completing the overall picture of the region\u2019s economic crisis.<\/p>\n\n
ChatGPT powiedzia\u0142: \n \nThe economic structure of Western Pomerania took its final shape in the second half of the 1950s. It was the result of various interacting factors, among which climatic conditions, geographical location, and historical circumstances played a significant role. However, the decisive factor was the policy of the central authorities toward the region\u2014particularly their shifting economic priorities. \n \nThe region\u2019s marginalization is clearly visible in the national economic plans and in the level of investment funds allocated to various sectors of the West Pomeranian economy. While in 1950 the Koszalin voivodeship accounted for 1.7% and the Szczecin voivodeship for 4.6% of total national investment outlays, by the 1980s these figures had dropped to only 1.4% and 3.2%, respectively. \n \nIt can therefore be said that by the second half of the 1950s, Western Pomerania had already become a peripheral region\u2014with a developed maritime and agricultural economy and a single strong urban center in Szczecin. Over the following decades, this picture remained largely unchanged.<\/p>\n\n
More:<\/p>\n\n
Kazimierz Koz\u0142owski, Pomorze Zachodnie w latach 1945-2010. Spo\u0142ecze\u0144stwo – w\u0142adza – gospodarka – kultura<\/em>\u00a0t. I i II, Szczecin: Wydawnictwo i Drukarnia \u201eKadruk\u201d 2012.<\/p>\n\n Ma\u0142gorzata\u00a0 Macha\u0142ek,\u00a0Adam Makowski, Elektryczno\u015b\u0107 w s\u0142u\u017cbie w\u0142adzy i ludzi. Elektryfikacja wsi Pomorza Zachodniego w pierwszym \u0107wier\u0107wieczu po drugiej wojnie \u015bwiatowej<\/em>, \u201ePrzegl\u0105d Zachodniopomorski<\/a>\u201d 2016<\/a>, nr\u00a03<\/a>, s. 67-86.<\/p>\n\n Ma\u0142gorzata Macha\u0142ek, Przemiany wsi zachodniopomorskiej 1945-1956<\/em>, Szczecin: Muzeum Narodowe, Wydawnictwo i Drukarnia \u201eKadruk 2012.<\/p>\n\n Adam Makowski, Pomorze Zachodnie w polityce gospodarczej Polski w latach 1950-1960<\/em>, Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczeci\u0144skiego 2006.<\/p>\n\n Ma\u0142gorzata Macha\u0142ek<\/em><\/p>\n\n