Terror from the Sky and the Nazi Ghost Factory in Police: How the Third Reich Tried to Win the War with Synthetic Fuel from Coal

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The Second World War left behind many subtle material traces embedded in the modern cultural landscape. Among the more intriguing are the remnants of Nazi factories that produced synthetic liquid fuels — facilities that sustained the functioning of the German war machine during the conflict.
In the final years of the war, these sites became the targets of intense Allied bombing raids. In the postwar reality, however, these costly and technologically advanced installations quickly lost their importance.
High operational costs and relatively low efficiency rendered them obsolete, making their continued use economically unjustifiable. Their purpose vanished along with the collapse of the Third Reich and its criminal ideology.

This article presents the history of the chemical plant Hydrierwerke Pölitz AG, established near the town of Police in today’s West Pomerania (Figure 1), as seen through the lens of reconnaissance aerial photographs taken by the U.S. Eighth Air Force.

The Nazi Dream of Economic Autarky and Liquid Fuels for the War Machine

By the late 1930s, about 90% of the energy consumed in Nazi Germany came from coal. In comparison, liquid fuels accounted for only 3% of total energy production. Their importance, however, soon began to rise in connection with Germany’s preparations for the coming war — a conflict that would forever change the face of Europe.

In 1938, Nazi Germany — then the world’s second-largest economy — produced and imported roughly 7 million tons of liquid fuels, a figure far below the production capacities of the Third Reich’s future adversaries. That same year, Great Britain imported 12 million tons, the Soviet Union (at the time an informal ally of Germany) produced 29 million tons, and the United States a staggering 164 million tons.

In the 1930s, Germany’s economy was almost entirely dependent on imported crude oil and other raw materials. For Nazi planners, it was clear that the impending war would drastically limit access to strategic resources, including petroleum. For this reason, key sectors of the German economy — particularly fuel production — were heavily subsidized to boost efficiency and output.

During the Second World War, German fuel policy rested on two main pillars: natural petroleum and synthetic fuel production. Exploiting oil resources within the Reich and in occupied or allied territories required continuous investment in exploration and drilling. Moreover, the chemical composition of European crude oil made it poorly suited for aviation fuel production.

Facing the shortage of natural resources, the Nazi leadership turned to coal-based synthetic fuel production, relying on the only resource the Third Reich possessed in abundance. Among the two main available technologies for producing synthetic liquid fuels, the regime favored the Bergius hydrogenation process, owned by I.G. Farben Industrie, over the Fischer–Tropsch synthesis used by Ruhrchemie.

Although the Bergius process was more complex and energy-intensive, it could utilize both lignite and hard coal — resources widely available in Germany. The Fischer–Tropsch method, by contrast, required coke, a critical raw material for metallurgy and armaments production. Hydrogenation by the Bergius method produced a high-quality base for refining aviation fuel, as well as other liquid fuels, synthetic rubber, and various useful chemical compounds. For these reasons, Hermann Göring strongly supported investments in synthetic fuel plants using this technology.

However, fuel produced by this method was several times more expensive than petroleum-based products imported from abroad or refined from natural crude oil.

In 1936, Nazi Germany imported about 70% of the liquid fuels it consumed. In the following years, however, domestic production capacity grew rapidly. By 1938, synthetic production had reached 1.6 million tons per year and continued to increase over the next five years. The peak year was 1944, when projected annual output, based on the first four months of production, reached nearly 6 million tons, while total fuel consumption by the German war machine stood at 11 million tons. This remained far below the 19 million tons identified before the war as the minimum required to sustain Germany’s military and industrial operations.

Beginning in May 1944, following an order by General Carl A. Spaatz, the German fuel industry became the primary target of U.S. air raids. The campaign targeted both synthetic plants and refineries, as well as logistical infrastructure such as railways, in order to disrupt coal deliveries and the distribution of finished products. As a result, by December 1944, production in the synthetic fuel sector had fallen to just 16% of its level at the beginning of the year.

Hydrierwerke Pölitz AG and Its Surroundings

The Construction of Hydrierwerke Pölitz AG and Its Surroundings

The construction of the Hydrierwerke Pölitz AG synthetic fuel plant began in 1938. Over the next two years, many key hydrogenation installations were completed, and fuel production was launched on July 15, 1940, shortly after the French campaign.

The facility was built about 10 kilometers north of Stettin (now Szczecin) — the largest city in the region, already home to a well-developed industrial base and a major seaport with several shipyards, automotive plants, an aircraft engine factory operated by Junkers, a steel mill, a paper factory, and many smaller enterprises, most of which had already been converted to wartime production. Many of these industries required large quantities of liquid and solid fuels, as well as other petroleum-based chemicals for their operations.

One of the main factors determining the plant’s location was its proximity to navigable waterways. The site had a convenient connection to the Baltic Sea via the Szczecin Lagoon, and to the distant Upper Silesian mining regions through the Oder River and its tributaries. A reliable source of freshwater was also essential for technological processes. In addition, the region already possessed a well-developed railway network, allowing for the efficient transport of produced fuels to military units.

Finally, the plant’s location — away from expected frontlines and enemy airfields — was considered strategically advantageous for ensuring its safety and continuity of production.

Thanks to these factors, in the early stages of the war, the factory appeared to be relatively well protected against potential bombing and sabotage. However, it soon became clear that this sense of security was illusory.

The operation of the plant required extensive investments in new port infrastructure along the Oder River. For this purpose, a network of interconnected logistical facilities was built, most of which handled the transport of raw materials. The factory required a constant and massive supply of coal — to produce one ton of synthetic fuel, about seven tons of hard coal were consumed. Of this amount, roughly five tons were burned to generate the electricity and heat needed for production, while the remaining two tons were used directly in the hydrogenation process. As a result, hundreds of thousands of tons of coal and other hydrocarbons had to be delivered to the plant each month to keep production uninterrupted.

Aerial reconnaissance photographs of the Oder near Stettin, taken by the U.S. Eighth Air Force during the earlier phases of the war, show numerous coal barges traveling down the river, along with empty vessels returning after unloading (Figure 3a). On the Szczecin riverfront, several large coal terminals and storage yards were constructed where the barges were unloaded (Figure 3b). The coal was then transferred into railway wagons and transported directly to the plant (Figure 3c). In case of a breakdown or destruction of one segment of the logistical chain, the remaining terminals could still operate, ensuring a steady flow of coal to Hydrierwerke. Near the factory, a large rail siding accommodated tanker wagons, which transported the produced fuels to the front (Figure 3d).

Reconnaissance photographs from July 1943 also reveal numerous Kriegsmarine ships moored along the Szczecin harbor (Figures 4a and 4b). Some awaited supplies and refueling with diesel fuel produced by Hydrierwerke, while others underwent major repairs and maintenance in floating docks. In the same series of aerial images, U-boats under construction are visible at the Vulcan shipyard (Figure 5a).

All these facilities, located near Szczecin’s historic center, were later bombed and destroyed by the U.S. Eighth Air Force (Figure 5b), along with the old town itself (Figures 6a and 6b).

Through the analysis of World War II aerial reconnaissance imagery, it is still possible today to reconstruct and narrate the history of this complex system of interconnected industrial and military sites — places that did not survive the war but remain etched in the landscape of memory.

Slave Labor – A Totalitarian Microcosm

The construction and operation of the synthetic fuel plant in Police required the recruitment of thousands of workers for this predominantly agricultural region. Alongside the development of new residential settlements on the outskirts of Police, temporary camps with wooden barracks were built to accommodate the incoming workforce. Before the outbreak of the war, the factory and its subcontractors employed free wage laborers from various countries. However, shortly after the end of the September Campaign, forced laborers from the occupied territories of Poland began to be brought to Police, followed later by workers from other countries conquered by the Third Reich. As a result, large-scale construction of new forced labor camps was initiated to sustain the growing workforce needed for the plant’s expanding production.

It is estimated that in 1940, Hydrierwerke employed approximately 6,500 wage laborers, 1,000 soldiers, and several tens of thousands of forced laborers. In the vicinity of the plant, there existed numerous camps that varied in size, function, and living conditions. Among them were four labor camps, two penal camps, and a subcamp of the Stutthof concentration camp.

According to eyewitness accounts, forced laborers died as a result of accidents, hunger, disease, exhaustion, and executions. They were also frequent victims of Allied bombings. Instances of camp infrastructure destruction and fires caused by air raids were documented in contemporary aerial reconnaissance photographs. Prisoners were also forced to defuse unexploded Allied bombs, often at the cost of their lives.

Despite the harsh living conditions, prisoners often engaged in both active and passive resistance against their oppressors. In 1943, the Polish Home Army (Armia Krajowa) carried out Operation “Synteza”, aimed at gathering intelligence on the Hydrierwerke plant. The information obtained — based mainly on observations reported by forced laborers and railway workers — was passed on to the Western Allies, contributing to the preparation of the 1944 bombing campaign.

Militarization

On September 5, 1940, less than two months after fuel production began, the plant was attacked for the first time by RAF bombers. The raids were repeated later that same year. Although their intensity and the resulting damage were moderate, it became clear that the factory was no longer safe. These conclusions served as an impulse for the intensive militarization of the area surrounding the plant.

As part of camouflage measures against air raids, hundreds of smoke generators were built around the plant. These devices released highly toxic substances — chlorosulfonic acid and a mixture of ammonium chloride with heavy oil — into the atmosphere, producing a thick, white smoke.

Numerous Allied reconnaissance photographs taken during bombing raids document these smoke screens over the facility. However, the smoke cover was never sufficient to completely conceal the factory from the view of Allied aircrews (Figure 9a).

Many of the concrete smoke generators have survived to this day near the ruins of Hydrierwerke. The plant itself was also camouflaged using netting and camouflage paint, although these methods were similarly of limited effectiveness (Figure 9b).

Due to electrostatic charges generated by camouflage nets moved by the wind and the risk of potential fires, this method of concealment could be used only in a few spatially limited sections of the factory.

Another passive protection method for the factory involved three mock refinery sites located about 10 km north and northwest of the plant, surrounded by extensive forests (Figure 10).

In daylight, these decoys were relatively easy to recognize and avoid. To increase their credibility, active anti-aircraft batteries were positioned around them. At night, bonfires were lit to simulate bomb explosions and fires, and together with other light effects, they were meant to distract Allied pilots.

However, these dummy targets proved largely ineffective — available aerial photographs from daytime bombing missions show no visible signs of damage in the following months (Figures 10a and 10b). Likewise, airborne laser scanning (ALS) data reveal no bomb craters near the mock sites, even though they are situated in old forested areas where other World War II features (trenches, gun positions, etc.) remain visible.

This most likely indicates that Allied pilots were aware of the existence of these decoys and had little difficulty identifying them (Figure 10c).

In the early stages of the war, Hydrierwerke was protected by dozens of barrage balloons deployed across the surrounding fields.

They were used from 1940 until the end of 1943, after which they were removed, as it was concluded that they posed no threat to Allied aircraft flying at high altitudes, well beyond the reach of the balloons.

The main pillar of Hydrierwerke’s active defense consisted of hundreds of anti-aircraft guns of various calibers.

Analysis of aerial photographs indicates that their number increased steadily until mid-1944. The German anti-aircraft units employed advanced technologies, including Würzburg fire-control radars, rangefinders, communication systems, searchlights, analog ballistic computers, and a well-developed logistical network ensuring ammunition supply. Anti-aircraft positions were often situated on sandy elevations amidst marshy areas and forest clearings.

Many earthen fortifications protecting the guns and ammunition depots have survived to this day in very good condition and can be documented using ALS (Airborne Laser Scanning) technology.

The Third Reich in ruins and the Nazi “green alternative”

The intense Allied air raids of 1944 led to the complete devastation of the synthetic fuel plant in Police. Analysis of aerial photographs from World War II makes it possible to trace in detail the gradual process of the factory’s destruction, revealing both the increasing intensity of the bombings and the final desperate attempts to carry out emergency repairs and restart production, regardless of cost.

Due to the notorious inaccuracy of the bombings, many bombs fell on nearby villages and fields, causing civilian casualties and destroying farms.

The air raids left numerous bomb craters that have become a permanent feature of today’s landscape of Police. In the forested zone surrounding the factory, hundreds of such traces have been preserved to this day.

In the farmlands, the situation is different: some craters have survived only in fallow areas and in small patches of woodland scattered among the fields. Most were filled in during postwar reclamation works, yet they can still be detected as positive crop marks during periods of drought.

The intensive Allied bombings in the second half of 1944 led to a catastrophic shortage of liquid fuels in Nazi Germany. The effectiveness of the bombing campaign is indirectly confirmed by an aerial photograph taken on August 21, 1944, by the U.S. Eighth Air Force, showing a recreational area directly behind the Szczecin Town Hall and the NSDAP headquarters (today the City Hall and Jasne Błonia). Half of the large lawn is occupied by an anti-aircraft battery, while the other half had been recently mowed to produce hay bales for horses, which — due to the fuel shortages that grounded trucks — had once again become vital for maintaining the Wehrmacht’s supply chains.

Due to problems with food production and distribution, many lawns, parks, and squares—often located among ruined houses—were converted into vegetable gardens, resembling the Western concept of “victory gardens.”

Contemporary local identity and a difficult past

As a result of the decisions made at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, Poland gained territories in the west and north that had previously belonged to Nazi Germany, while simultaneously losing its eastern lands. Both Szczecin and Police ultimately became part of Poland, although this process was accompanied by certain complications.

The monumental ruins of the former Nazi chemical factory have survived to this day, remaining a striking feature of the cultural landscape of modern-day Police.

From October 1945, Police was transformed into a Soviet military enclave, temporarily excluded from Polish administration. The presence and activities of the Red Army further deteriorated the already poor technical condition of the plant. Soviet soldiers employed thousands of German prisoners of war and civilian laborers to dismantle the valuable installations that had survived the war. They also salvaged reusable materials, including non-ferrous metals and other valuable resources, which were transported to the USSR by rail and sea.

ChatGPT powiedział: After the enclave was dissolved in September 1946, the area was placed under the supervision of the Polish Army. In 1965, construction began on a new chemical plant nearby, specializing in the production of mineral fertilizers. As a result, the ruins of Hydrierwerke Pölitz AG became a troublesome—if not outright unwanted—heritage site. As is often the case with abandoned military installations, the site became shrouded in mystery, all the more so because Polish military oversight continued until the 1990s.

After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the grounds of the old factory became accessible to the public. This marked the beginning of an era of appropriation and spontaneous exploration. In the collective local memory, the ruins of the plant underwent a transformation — from a forbidden zone into an “other world”, where ordinary rules and norms no longer applied. During the 1990s and early 2000s, the site attracted a variety of subcultural groups — punks, people struggling with drug addiction, and even alleged “Satanists.” The presence of these real or imagined subcultures reinforced the perception of the ruins as an inverted or alternative dimension. The walls of the decaying buildings, covered in layers of graffiti, remain a visible testament to that period.

Over the past two decades, however, a significant transformation has taken place. Growing awareness of the site’s historical importance, along with its deteriorating structural condition, led to the emergence of the first grassroots initiatives aimed at commemoration and preservation. A major milestone came in 2006 with the founding of the “SKARB” Association by local history enthusiasts. Thanks to their efforts, the site was brought under civil supervision, and clean-up operations were carried out. Overgrown vegetation was removed, information boards were installed, and designated walking paths were established to ensure visitor safety. The association organizes weekly guided tours of the Hydrierwerke area, hosts themed events such as Museum Night, and publishes valuable historical and popular-science articles. Despite numerous challenges, since 2006 the old factory has gradually become an important part of the cultural landscape of modern Police. Today, the association leases two adjacent World War II air-raid shelters, integrating them into its educational and preservation activities.

ChatGPT powiedział: They serve as exhibition spaces for military artifacts and educational materials. A significant part of the display is dedicated to commemorating the fate of the thousands of forced laborers who once toiled in and around the factory.

Today, there is a growing need to shift the narrative — from viewing the site as an “enclave of otherness or adventure” toward one focused on remembrance of the crimes and victims. The first stage of this transformation occurred in the 1990s, when the ruins were often described as “forbidden,” “mysterious,” or “unknown.” The initiatives undertaken by the “SKARB” Association have since introduced a gradual narrative change — one that is more mature and empathetic, grounded in the biographies of the victims and in a deeper understanding of the site’s historical and moral significance.

Grzegorz Kiarszys, Maksymilian Dzikowski