State Agricultural Farms in Western Pomerania (1945–1991)

The beginning of the state sector in Polish agriculture is usually associated with the establishment of the State Agricultural Farms (Państwowe Gospodarstwa Rolne, PGR) in 1949. In reality, however, the creation of the state agricultural sector had already begun in 1946, with the formation of the State Land Estates (Państwowe Nieruchomości Ziemskie, PNZ). Their task was to manage and develop landed estates located in the so-called Recovered Territories. Later, the PNZ’s activities were extended to the entire country, although their main area of operation remained the former German territories. These regions were characterized by an agricultural structure dominated by large landed estates of more than 100 hectares. According to the 1939 agricultural census, such estates accounted for 52.8% of the total agricultural land in Western Pomerania. In 1946, the PNZ took over approximately six thousand estates across Poland, with the largest concentration in Western Pomerania — the regional administration in Szczecin managed 775 estates, and the regional administration in Koszalin oversaw 677 properties.

Most of these estates, devastated by wartime and postwar destruction and looting, were in a deplorable condition — livestock was lacking, buildings lay in ruins, and the land lay fallow. The State Land Estates (PNZ) therefore needed workers willing to undertake hard labor in very difficult conditions. At that time, a large-scale resettlement campaign was underway, but most Polish settlers preferred individual farms, and only a few chose to work as agricultural laborers. A temporary solution was to retain the former German workers. Because of the persistent shortage of Polish laborers, in many estates — particularly in the area that later became the Koszalin Voivodeship (from 1950) — German workers constituted the majority of the workforce until the early 1950s.

Despite enormous difficulties, the PNZ achieved a number of successes, partially developing the estates and preparing them for parceling. However, they were managed by prewar specialists, often of landowning background, which made them a target of political attacks as the communist authorities consolidated power. Some directors were arrested and accused of economic crimes. Such was the case of Władysław Czarnecki, director of the Koszalin PNZ district, who was sentenced to death for alleged actions against the state (he was acquitted after 1956). Ultimately, the PNZ enterprise was dissolved, and all its resources — employees, buildings, livestock, and land — were taken over by the State Agricultural Farms (PGR), established in 1949.

This decision was political rather than economic, as evidenced by the purges carried out among the management staff at the time. Plans for the future of the former German estates also changed — they were no longer to be parceled into smaller farms but were to remain state-owned. This marked the beginning of Stalinization in Poland, with Soviet-style models being implemented in all areas of life. In the countryside, the goal was to eliminate individual land ownership: peasants were expected to contribute their farms to production cooperatives (modeled on kolkhozes), while the remaining land was to be transferred to the State Agricultural Farms (PGRs) (modeled on sovkhozes). In official propaganda, the PGRs were portrayed as the vanguard of socialist agricultural transformation and were called “factories of grain and meat”. They were intended to demonstrate the superiority of collectivized economy over peasant farming.

The PGRs began expanding their cultivated area, particularly in the so-called Recovered Territories. In Western Pomerania, they initially controlled about 7.5% of total agricultural land, but by 1956 this had increased to 12.1% in the Szczecin Voivodeship and 14.4% in the Koszalin Voivodeship. In addition to taking over large estates, they also acquired land from various users, particularly fallow land and the property of individual farmers who abandoned their farms, and after 1956, also some land from dissolved production cooperatives. Over the following decades, the amount of land owned by the PGRs continued to grow. By 1975, they controlled 51.4% of agricultural land in the Szczecin Voivodeship and 48.8% in the Koszalin Voivodeship, and by the late 1980s, these figures had risen to 55.1% and 52.8%, respectively. It is worth noting that on a national scale, the share of agricultural land held by PGRs in the 1980s was 19.4%, making Western Pomerania the region with the highest proportion of PGR-owned farmland in the country.

Initially, most individual PGRs resembled prewar manorial farms, cultivating 200–400 hectares of land. However, in the early 1960s, a process of consolidation began — single farms were merged to form multi-unit enterprises or complexes managing 2,000–3,000 hectares. Even larger agricultural units were created in the 1970s, with some complexes cultivating 5,000 hectares or more. Managing these giants proved very difficult and generally inefficient. This organizational structure, with only minor changes, persisted until the end of the PGR system.

Although PGRs received substantial state subsidies and were far better equipped with machinery and production resources compared to individual farms, they achieved much lower economic results than private agricultural holdings. Numerous inspections revealed that poor management, inefficiency, and waste were widespread. Employees treated state property as nobody’s property, feeling no responsibility for its neglect or misappropriation. It was also commonly accepted to use farm assets as if they were one’s own. There were many reasons for this situation, but the most important stemmed from the very nature of the socialist economy at the time. Similar phenomena, though on varying scales, occurred throughout the entire economy. In the case of PGRs, however, they were particularly noticeable due to the stark contrast with peasant farms, which, despite having far fewer resources, produced significantly better results through the diligent work of the farmers.

The economic activity of PGRs was based on a command-and-distribution system, and centrally determined economic plans did not always reflect the actual capabilities of individual PGRs. Under such conditions, farm managers did not feel responsible for meeting the imposed targets. To avoid consequences, reports were often falsified or losses attributed to circumstances beyond the PGRs’ control, such as bad weather or animal diseases. The attitude of management also affected the work ethic of subordinate employees. Low wages and an unattractive incentive system offered little motivation for efficient work, while poor performance of a given PGR usually did not affect employee salaries, social benefits, or investments. State subsidies covered losses resulting from poor planning, mismanagement, or waste.

An attempt to partially move away from central management in PGRs was made in the early 1980s. At that time, an economic reform known as the “3 S” (self-governance, independence, self-financing) was introduced throughout the economy. The reform also applied to PGRs, granting them limited freedom in economic decision-making, reducing bureaucracy and centralization. Most subsidies were withdrawn, and organizational changes were implemented once again. The result was a slight improvement in production outcomes, but the fundamental causes of the low performance of the state sector were not eliminated.

During the PRL period, PGRs were widely regarded as a symbol of waste and inefficiency, but this did not mean that all PGRs were always unprofitable. Some achieved good results by adopting modern production methods. Success always depended on the manager or director and their qualifications — not only technical expertise in agriculture, but, above all, management skills. The most important abilities were motivating employees, supervising them, and enforcing consequences. Among motivational factors, the possibility of receiving housing, a scarce commodity in the PRL, was the most significant. It was more difficult to enforce duties among workers, not only due to the size of the workforce but mainly because of the persistent labor shortage. Firing an employee who underperformed, or even someone who committed minor thefts, such as taking feed for their own livestock, meant that there would be no one to replace them. Both wages and working conditions for manual workers were far worse than in the city, so PGRs typically employed people who could not find other jobs. During peak seasonal work, such as harvests or potato digging, PGRs supplemented their workforce with wives and children of employees, as well as soldiers, and especially school and university students.

What was most lacking, however, were specialists knowledgeable in animal husbandry, crop cultivation, and mechanization. After the dismissal of prewar experts still employed during the PNZ period, management positions were filled by individuals promoted for political loyalty — loyal to the authorities but lacking professional qualifications. The new workforce had to be trained from scratch. Numerous agricultural schools — vocational and secondary — were established, and in 1954 the Higher School of Agriculture in Szczecin was founded. However, graduates were reluctant to work in PGRs. The situation began to change only in the second half of the 1960s, when wages and living conditions in PGRs improved somewhat. Usually, the most important incentive for taking up work in state agriculture was the provision of housing — in the cities, one often waited years, whereas in a PGR, every employee was guaranteed accommodation. To attract workers, especially specialists, modern apartment blocks began to be built in the 1960s, replacing old prewar manorial buildings. Although multi-story blocks were architecturally out of place in traditional villages, they offered residents city-level standards — running water, bathrooms, central heating, and symbolic rent, as most maintenance costs were covered by the PGR. When large agricultural complexes began to emerge in the 1960s, the concept of agrotowns was introduced. These were settlements of multi-story blocks equipped with service facilities — kindergartens, shops, hair salons, medical clinics. Such settlements were built in small towns like Chojna, Nowogard, and Tymień, and employees were transported daily to work, often at distant PGRs.

ChatGPT powiedział: The fate of the PGRs was sealed by the collapse of the communist system in 1989. The command-and-distribution system of economic management was replaced by market mechanisms. The vast majority of PGRs were unable to adapt to the new economic conditions, and those that tried ran out of time, as they were liquidated in 1991. Their assets were intended to be privatized, and until sold, the land was leased out. The liquidation of PGR property was handled by the State Treasury Agricultural Property Agency, established by the government. It took over more than 3.7 million hectares of arable land, with the largest holdings in the Szczecin Voivodeship (294,000 ha) and the Koszalin Voivodeship (430,000 ha).

The former PGR employees found themselves in an especially difficult situation. The liquidation of these enterprises meant the loss of their jobs at a time when there were few alternative employment opportunities in the area. Only a small number were employed in the new farms established on the basis of former PGRs. These former state farm workers lost the economic and social security — housing, healthcare, recreation, etc. — that PGRs had previously provided. Regions with a high concentration of PGRs quickly became areas of highest unemployment, especially since the local labor market was very limited. The social consequences in the form of unemployment and impoverishment of PGR communities are most often cited by critics of the decision to liquidate and privatize PGRs. They do not dispute the need for restructuring or privatization of the state sector, but emphasize that the transformation process could have better addressed social factors. On the other hand, supporters of the adopted solutions point mainly to economic factors, stressing that after the transition period, enterprises established on the basis of former PGRs began to generate profits.

More:

Włodzimierz Dzun, Państwowe gospodarstwa rolne w rolnictwie polskim 1944-1990, Warszawa: Instytut Rozwoju Wsi i Rolnictwa PAN 1992.

Marek Ignar, Pracownicy państwowych gospodarstw rolnych, Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe 1974.

Machałek Małgorzata, Przemiany wsi zachodniopomorskiej, Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego 2012.

Machałek Małgorzata, Likwidacja państwowych gospodarstw rolnych i pierwszy etap przekształceń własnościowych państwowego sektora rolnego. Przyczynek do badań, „Roczniki Dziejów Społecznych i Gospodarczych”, 2022, t. 84.

Machałek Małgorzata, No chance of success – State Agrarian Real Estate 1946-1949 a contribution to the research on the history of the state agricultural sector in Poland, „Studia Historiae Oeconomicae” 2021, vol. 39. 

Bartosz Panek, Zboże rosło jak las. Pamięć o pegeerach, Wołowiec: Wydawnictwo Czarne 2024.

Małgorzata Machałek